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Discharges under the 
New Bankruptcy 
Code 
David G. Epstein, 
Dean, University of Arkansas School of Law, in Fayetteville 
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978, Title 11 of the United States Code ("Code"). 
"B.C.D." refers to the Bankruptcy Court Decisions; "B.R.," to 
West's Bankruptcy Reporter; "C.B.C.," to Collier's Bankruptcy 
Cases; and "UCC," to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
A. Effect of a Discharge 
1. A discharge protects the debtor from any further personal lia-
bility on discharged debts. It voids judgments on discharged 
debts and enjoins any legal action to collect the debts from the 
debtor or from the property of the debtor. §524(a). Extra judi-
cial collection acts, such as dunning letters or telephone calls 
to collect discharged debts, are also barred. 
2. Sections 524(c) and (d) severely limit the use of any reaffirma-
tion agreement - an agreement to pay a debt discharged in 
bankruptcy - by: 
a. Requiring that the agreement be executed before the 
discharge is granted; 
b. Providing a hearing at which the bankruptcy court advises 
the debtor of the consequences of reaffirmation and that 
he is not required to reaffirm discharged debts; 
c. Giving the debtor a right to rescind the reaffirmation 
agreement for 30 days after the reaffirmation hearing; and 
d. If the reaffirmed debt is a "consumer debt" not secured by 
real property, requiring that the bankruptcy court ap-
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prove the agreement if it finds either that the agreement 
does not impose undue hardship and is in the debtor's best 
interests or that the agreement is a good faith settlement of 
dischargeability litigation under section 523 or provides 
for a redemption under section 722. 
i. Note that if a creditor can convince the court that the 
reaffirmation agreement meets the section 524(c)(4)(B) re-
quirement that it be a good faith settlement of dischargea-
bility litigation under section 523 or provide for a redemp-
tion under section 722, then the court need not find that 
the reaffirmation is in the best interest of the debtor, as re-
quired by section 524(c)(4)(A). 
ii. What is a "redemption under section 722"? Obviously, 
if D owes C $3,000, a reaffirmation agreement calling for 
the payment of $2,000 plus interest is a "redemption under 
section 722," governed by section 524(c)(4)(B), not section 
524(c)(4)(A). What about an agreement to pay C the en-
tire $3,000 plus interest? Does the fact that the debtor will 
pay significantly more than he would be required to pay 
by section 722 prevent the agreement from being a "re-
demption under section 722" and make the agreement sub-
ject to the "best interest of the debtor" test of section 
524(c)(4)(A)? 
iii. Section 524(c)(4)(B) also applies to any "settlement of 
litigation under section 523." Is a determination of the 
merits of the litigation necessary? If D files a Chapter 7 pe-
tition while owing C $3,000 and C claims that D submit-
ted a false financial statement to induce the loan, when D 
signs a reaffirmation agreement, does C have to file a non-
dischargeability complaint to come within section 524(c)-
(4)(B)? Does section 524(c)(4)(B) require the bankruptcy 
court to examine the merit of C's section 523(a)(2)(B) as-
sertions? 
iv. Query: In applying the "best interests" test of section 
524(c)(4)(A), can a court consider noneconomic factors, 
such as the fact that the debtor's mother is a cosigner on 
the note? 
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v. In re Avis, 6 B.C.D. 83, 3 B.R. 205 (S.D. Ohio 1980), 
refused to approve the reaffirmation of a debt cosigned by 
personal friends of the debtor. A number of cases have dis-
approved reaffirmation agreements when the amount of 
the debt reaffirmed is much greater than the value of the 
property securing the debt. In re Blount, 6 B.C.D. 618, 4 
B.R. 92 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Jenkins, 6 B.C.D. 471, 4 
B.R. 65 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
e. Requesting a reaffirmation of a prebankruptcy debt as a 
condition precedent to granting a new postbankruptcy 
loan violates section 362(a)(6), which prohibits a creditor 
from taking any action to recover a claim against the debt-
or that arose before the commencement of the case. In re 
Stephens, 5 B.C.D. 1376, 2 B.R. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
f. Reaffirmation of a consumer debt requires new Truth in 
Lending disclosures. Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Gut-
shall, 274 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1979), overruled in part, 
Ipalco Employees Credit Union v. Culver, 309 N.W.2d 
484 (Iowa 1981). 
3. Subject to very limited exceptions, a governmental unit may 
not deny the debtor a license or a franchise or otherwise dis-
criminate against him solely because he has received a bank-
ruptcy discharge and refuses to pay discharged debts. §525. 
Cf. In re Coleman American Moving Services, Inc., 7 B.C.D. 
142, 8 B.R. 379 (Kan. 1980). 
a. The protection afforded by section 525 is limited. 
i. The section applies only to "governmental units," not to 
private employers or a quasigovernmental organization 
such as a state bar association. 
ii. The section only prohibits actions based "solely" on 
bankruptcy. It does not forbid the consideration of such 
factors as future financial ability or responsibility. 
B. What a Discharge Does Not Do 
1. A bankruptcy discharge protects only the debtor. §524(d). A 
READER'S 
ANNOTATIONS 
READER'S 
ANN OT A TIO NS 
70 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS JOURNAL Vol. 6 No. 4 
bankruptcy discharge does not affect the liability of other 
parties such as. codebtors or guarantors. 
a. For example, if an insurance company is liable to the 
plaintiff in a personal injury action as a matter of state tort 
law, the subsequent bankruptcy discharge of the insured 
defendant does not alter the obligation of the insurance 
company. 
2. The Fair Credit Reporting Act authorizes consumer reporting 
agencies to report any bankruptcy filings of a credit applicant 
within the past ten years. 15 U.S.C. §1688. 
3. A debtor who has been discharged from his debts may be dis-
charged from his nongovernmental job. 
4. Professional organizations such as bar associations regularly 
obtain information about an applicant's bankruptcy history. 
5. A radio station can refuse to broadcast the advertising of a 
Chapter 11 debtor that does not disclose the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In re Coachlight Dinner Theater of Nanuet, Inc., 7 
B.C.D. 226, 8 B.R. 657 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
6. A bankruptcy discharge does not protect a debtor from being 
prosecuted for fraudulently writing checks. See generally 
Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher 
Start, 58 N.C.L. REv. 723, 736 (1980). 
7. A bankruptcy discharge has no impact on a lien that is valid in 
bankruptcy. Longv. Bullard, 117U.S. 617 (1886); In re Bell, 7 
B.C.D. 219, 8 B.R. 549 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Contra, In re Wil-
liams, 7 B.C.D. 388, 9 B.R. 228 (Kan. 1981). 
a. Thus, if D owes C $5,000, secured in part by a Chrysler 
Cordoba worth $3,000, and D files for relief under Chap-
ter 7, when D receives a Chapter 7 discharge, C's security 
interest is not terminated. If D defaults on his payments, C 
can repossess the Chrysler pursuant to UCC section 9-503. 
The discharge does, however, wipe out C's rights against 
D personally. If C repossesses and sells the Chrysler, he 
cannot obtain a deficiency judgment against D. 
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C. Discharge Procedures under Chapter 7 
1. Only individuals are eligible for a discharge under Chapter 7. 
§727(a). 
2. The discharge is automatic without any application by the 
debtor unless the trustee or a creditor objects to the discharge 
under section 727(a). Cf Rule 404(d). 
a. Under Rule 404, as amended by suggested Interim Bank-
ruptcy Rule 4002, the bankruptcy court sets a deadline for 
filing complaints objecting to the debtor's discharge and 
notifies creditors of this date. 
b. If any creditor files an objection to a discharge, the bank-
ruptcy court tries the issue of the debtor's right to a dis-
charge. 
c. Litigation over an objection to a discharge is an adversary 
proceeding governed by Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
d. The objecting party has the burden of proving the facts on 
which its objection is based. Rule 407. See generally In re 
Ramos, 7 B.C.D. 458, 8 B.R. 490 (W.D. Wis. 1981). 
3. Section 727(a) sets out all of the grounds for objecting to a 
discharge in a Chapter 7 case. 
a. The debtor is not an "individual." §727(a)(l). 
b. The debtor has transferred property with an "intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor. §727(a)(2). 
i. A transfer of fully encumbered property cannot be the 
basis of an objection under section 727(a)(2). In re Harris, 
7 B.C.D. 437, 8 B.R. 88 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
c. The debtor has unjustifiably failed to keep books and 
records. §727(a)(3). 
d. The debtor has "knowingly and fraudulently": 
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i. Made a false oath or account in connection with a 
bankruptcy case; 
ii. Presented or used a false claim against the estate; 
iii. Received or given consideration for action or inaction 
in the bankruptcy proceeding; or 
iv. Withheld books and records from the bankruptcy 
trustee. §727(a)(4). 
e. The debtor has failed to explain "satisfactorily" any loss 
of, or deficiency in, assets. § 727 ( a)(5). 
i. This ground focuses on the truth of the debtor's expla-
nation, not on the wisdom of the expenditures. 
f. The debtor has refused to obey a court order or to answer 
questions after being granted immunity or after improper-
ly invoking the constitutional privilege against self-incrim-
ination. §727(a)(6). 
i. Immunity is not automatic. Section 344 provides that 
immunity to debtors may be granted under Part V of Title 
18, which, in 18 U.S.C. section 6003, requires an applica-
tion by the United States Attorney. 
g. The debtor has committed any act specified in "b" to "f" 
above not more than one year before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition in connection with another bankruptcy 
case concerning an "insider." §727(a)(7). 
h. The debtor was granted a discharge in another case com-
menced within six years. §§727(a)(8) and (9). 
i. The six years are measured from petition to petition. 
ii. A Chapter 13 or XIII discharge is no bar if full payment 
has been made to the holders of unseeured claims or at least 
70 per cent payment was made to the holders of unsecured 
claims and this represented the debtor's "best efforts." 
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iii. Sections 727(a)(8) and (9) only limit the availability of 
a discharge in Chapter 7; they do not affect the ability of 
the debtor or creditors to file Chapter 7 petitions. 
i. The court approves a written waiver of discharge executed 
by the debtor after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
§727(a)(l0). 
4. Exceptions to the discharge of particular debts, based on sec-
tions 523(a)(2), (4), and (6), must be asserted in bankruptcy 
court. §523(c). 
a. The time for filing requests for exceptions will be controlled 
by the new bankruptcy rules, when promulgated. 
b. Under Rule 409, as amended by suggested Interim Bank-
ruptcy Rule 4003, the bankruptcy court sets a deadline for 
filing a complaint contending that a particular debt is ex-
cepted from discharge by sections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). 
c. Any such complaint is tried as an adversary proceeding 
under Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
5. A creditor or the debtor may file a complaint with the 
bankruptcy court to determine whether a particular debt is 
excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(l), (3), (5), (7), or 
(8). Rule 409(a)(l). 
a. The issue of dischargeability under these sections may also 
arise in connection with the creditor's collection efforts in 
a nonbankruptcy forum. 
i. To illustrate, B, while owing C $600 under a "property 
settlement agreement," files a Chapter 7 petition and re-
ceives a discharge. Conly receives $100 from the bankruptcy 
distribution. A month later, C sues Bin state court. If Bas-
serts his bankruptcy discharge, C can counter with a claim 
of an exception from discharge based on section 523(a)(5). 
b. A bankruptcy court is not limited to a review of the judg-
ment and record in a prior nonbankruptcy proceeding 
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when deciding a claim for an exception from discharge. 
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979). In In re Lilley, 8 
B.R. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1981), a state court judgment on a con-
tract theory did not preclude the bankruptcy court from 
considering additional evidence of fraud. 
D. Dehts Excepted from Discharge under Chapter 7 
1. Section 523(a) contains an exclusive list of the debts that are 
excepted from discharge. The most significant exceptions are 
the following: 
2. Taxes. Bankruptcy affords very little relief to the delinquent 
taxpayer. Most taxes are not discharged in bankruptcy. 
a. All excise and income taxes for the three tax years immedi-
ately preceding bankruptcy are excepted from the bank-
ruptcy discharge. §523(a)(l). 
i. To determine this three-year period, compare the dates 
on which the tax return and the bankruptcy petition were 
filed. If D files a Chapter 7 petition on April 14, 1981, and 
his income tax return is not due until April 15, 1981, his 
tax obligations for 1980, 1979, 1978, and 1977 are ex-
cepted from discharge. 
b. Taxes more than three years old are nondischargeable if a 
return was never filed, a late return was filed within two 
years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, or the return 
filed was "fraudulent." §§523(a)(l)(B) and (C). 
i. Section l 7(a)(l)(c) of the old Bankruptcy Act contained 
a similar three-year rule for taxes not reported on a return. 
The courts held that taxes are not "reported on a return" if 
the return stated the facts giving rise to the liability but 
not the liability. In re Donnell, 639 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 
1981); Wukelic v. United States, 544 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 
1976). There is no comparable language in the new Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
3. Credit card purchases. Debts resulting from last-minute 
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credit card purchases are not discharged. §523(a)(2)(A). 
Thus, if D uses his credit card for the purchase of a color 
television set the day before he files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition, bankruptcy will not discharge this debt. 
a. Section 523(a)(2)(A) is the counterpart to section 17(a)(2) 
under the old Bankruptcy Act. Section l 7(a)(2) was suc-
cessfully invoked by creditors to except certain credit card 
purchasers from the operation of the discharge. See Zaret-
sky, Intent to Repay, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1073 (1977). 
b. Section 523(a)(2) expressly requires a "false representa-
tion." 
i. A credit card user represents that he is employing the 
credit card in accordance with the line of credit extended, 
which he undertakes to repay. 
ii. In re Stewart, 7 B.R. 551 (M.D. Ga. 1980), relied on 
section 523(a)(2)(A) and the case law under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act to find credit card purchases nondischargeable. 
The debtor there used his MasterCharge card from Sep-
tember 25 to October 2 to charge goods and services total-
ling $300.40, without a single charge over $50. The debtor 
filed for bankruptcy relief on October 16. 
iii. In re Lyon, 8 B.R. 152, 3 C.B.C. 2d 644 (Me. 1981), 
held that mere proof that a credit line was exceeded was 
not sufficient "to infer an intent not to pay." 
iv. Section 523(a)(2)(A) is silent as to the debtor's intent to 
deceive and the creditor's reliance, but section 523(a)-
(2)(B) expressly requires such deception and reliance. De-
ception and reliance were required by the credit card cases 
under old section 17 ( a)(2). Credit card cases under the 
new section 523(a)(2)(A) also require proof of the qebtor's 
deception and the creditor's reliance. In re Stewart, 7 B.R. 
551, 554-55 (M.D. Ga. 1980). 
4. False financial statements. A debt acquired by using a materi-
ally false financial statement, made with intent to deceive, on 
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which the creditor reasonably relied, is not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. §523(a)(2)(B). 
a. Reliance can be established even though the debtor did not 
obtain any "fresh cash" from the creditor. Cf. In re Arch-
angeli, 7 B.C.D. 63, 6 B.R. 50 (Me. 1980). 
b. A credit check that reveals outstanding undisclosed loans 
defeats reliance. In re Schlickmann, 7 B.C.D. 30, 6 B.R. 
281 (Mass. 1980). 
c. In re Archangeli, 7 B.C.D. 63, 6 B.R. 50 (Me. 1980), 
seems to find an intent to deceive from the nature of the 
false statements. On the other hand, when a creditor com-
pletes a loan application, the intent to deceive claim is 
weakened. In re Schlickmann, 7 B.C.D. 30, 6 B.R. 281 
(Mass. 1980). 
d. Section 523(d) requires a bankruptcy court to charge a 
creditor who files unsuccessfully an exception to discharge 
under section 523(a)(2) with a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the debtor's attorney unless "clearly inequitable." 
i. Attorneys' fees of $350 were awarded in In re Majewski, 
7 B.C.D. 112, 7 B.R. 904 (Conn. 1980), even though the 
creditor's complaint was filed in good faith. Attorneys' fees 
of $2,600 were awarded in In re Schlickmann, 7 B.C.D. 
30, 6 B.R. 281 (Mass. 1980), even though the creditor's 
complaint was not filed in bad faith. 
ii. In re Archangeli, 7 B.C.D. 63, 6 B.R. 50 (Me. 1980), 
refused to award attorneys' fees when the creditor estab-
lished the debtor's intent to deceive. "No judgment for at-
torneys' fees . . . is warranted because there is no showing 
... that the action by the Plaintiff was frivolous and was 
not brought in good faith." In re Wetmore, 8 B.R. 629, 
630 (M.D. Fla. 1981). 
5. Sale of encumbered property. If the debtor causes "willful 
and malicious injury ... to the property of another entity," 
the debt for which the property was encumbered is not dis-
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charged. §523(a)(6). Thus, when S sells Don credit a televi-
sion set in which S retains a security interest, and if D sells the 
set "willfully and maliciously" to neighbor N and then files a 
Chapter 7 petition, the debt of D to Sis not discharged, even 
though the sale defeats S's security interest under UCC section 
9-307(2) and S remains with an unsecured claim against D. 
a. Under the old Bankruptcy Act, section l 7(a)(2) excepted 
from discharge liabilities for "willful and malicious con-
version of the property of another." A number of cases ap-
plied this language to bankrupts who disposed of encum-
bered property prior to bankruptcy. Bennett v. W. T. 
Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). 
b. Section 523(a)(6) does not mention conversion. But the 
phrase "willful and malicious injury" in the section covers 
a willful and malicious conversion. CONG. REc. 17 ,412 
(Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Senator DeConcini). 
c. Both the old act and the new Code use the phrase "willful 
and malicious." Legislative history indicates that a dif-
ferent meaning is intended for the phrase in the Code. 
"Under this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or inten-
tional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473 
(1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the 
extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 
'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled." H.R. 
REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1978). 
d. In In re Hodges, 4 B.R. 513 (W.D. Va. 1980), D purchased 
a stereo from Son credit, with S retaining a security inter-
est. D sold the stereo to N and filed for Chapter 7 relief. S 
filed a complaint asserting an exception to discharge under 
section 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court found that S failed 
to sustain its burden: 
While he may well have willfully sold the secured property, he did 
not appear to do so maliciously. Testimony from the Debtor indicated 
that he did not intend to hurt or harm Grand Piano by selling the 
goods; he only meant to raise money to make his monthly mortgage 
payment. He clearly intended to continue payments to Plaintiff if 
able. We cannot circumvent that direct testimony absent testimony to 
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the contrary. We cannot hypothesize anything further about the Debt-
or's intent. We must therefore find that he did not sell the property 
"maliciously." Id., at 517. 
i. Query: Will the debtor usually intend to harm the 
specific holder of the secured claim? How can the secured 
holder meet the test of Hodges? 
6. Domestic obligations. Alimony, maintenance, and support 
obligations are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. §523(a)(5). 
a. Section 523(a)(5) replaces section l 7a(7) of the old 
Bankruptcy Act. Section 17 a(7) excepted child support 
and alimony for the maintenance or support of a wife 
from the operation of the discharge, but not obligations 
generated by a property settlement agreement. 
This distinction in treatment arises from the basic differences between 
the purposes served by a division of marital property in a settlement 
agreement and the purposes served by imposition of the obligation of 
support or alimony payments. Alimony payments are intended to pro-
vide support for the spouse who may have no marketable skills or 
available time for employment due to his or her past and present 
obligations in the home and support payments are intended to pro-
vide support for the children in that spouse's custody .... Public 
policy favors such payments as long as they are useful in furthering 
society's interest that families not be left destitute .... The alimony 
and child support obligations arise from the dependent relationship 
between a husband and wife which may be created by a marriage .... 
On the other hand, property settlements are designed to distribute at 
the time of divorce the property acquired by the spouses during the 
marriage .... Property settlements are based on the equities existing 
between the parties at the time of divorce rather than on the wife's 
needs and the husband's income .... In re Walder, 10 C.B.C. 236, 
240-41 (N.D. Wis. 1976). 
b. Legislative history indicates that "[ w ]hat constitutes ali-
mony, maintenance or support will be determined under 
the bankruptcy laws, not State law." H.R. REP. No. 
95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978). 
c. ln In re Demkow, 8 B.R. 554, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1981), the 
bankruptcy court held the debtor's obligation to pay a sec-
ond mortgage on his former wife's house dischargeable. 
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The separation agreement separately provided for ali-
mony and headed the provision for the payment of the sec-
ond mortgage "debts." Demkow is inconsistent with most 
cases and commentary. 
d. A number of cases have held that when a divorce decree 
requires a debtor to pay the attorneys' fees of his former 
spouse, the obligation is not dischargeable. In re Wells, 7 
B.C.D. 272, 8 B.R. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Knabe, 7 
B.C.D. 185, 8 B.R. 53 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 
i. But In re Crawford, 7 B.C.D. 275, 8 B.R. 552 (Kan. 
1981), relied on the language in section 523(a)(5)(A) to hold 
an attorney's fee obligation dischargeable as "assigned to 
another entity." 
E. Discharge Procedures under Chapter 13 
1. Section 1328( a) requires the discharge of a debtor who has com-
pleted all of the payments required by his Chapter 13 plan. 
2. Section 1328(b) gives the bankruptcy court discretion to grant 
a "hardship" discharge to a debtor who has failed to make all 
the payments required by the plan. 
3. In a proceeding under Chapter 13, whether the debtor will 
receive a discharge cannot be determined until the debtor 
either completes the payments under the plan or completes 
his efforts to make payments under the plan. §1328. 
4. Numerous courts have considered discharge issues in deter-
mining whether to confirm a plan under section 1325. See 
Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation of Chapter 13 Compo-
sition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 659, 
671-73 (1981). 
F. Debts Excepted from Discharge under Chapter 13 
1. The section 1328(a) discharge of a debtor who has made all 
the payments required by the plan is more comprehensive 
than the section 1328(b) "hardship" discharge. 
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a. Except for alimony, maintenance, and support obligations, 
which are not dischargeable, the section 523 exceptions 
are inapplicable to a section 1328(a) discharge. §1328(a)-
(2); In re Seely, 6 B.C.D. 1003, 6 B.R. 309 (E.D. Va. 
1980). 
i. Senate Bill 863, filed on April 2, 1981, would change 
this. 
b. A long-term debt, such as a house mortgage, upon which 
the payments provided by the Chapter 13 plan extend be-
yond the term of the plan is not discharged. §1328(a)(l). 
i. But education loans are discharged under section 
1328(a) even if the payments extend beyond the term of 
the plan. In re Smith, 8 B.R. 543 (Utah 1981). 
c. The section 523 exceptions are applicable to a section 
1328(b) discharge. Long-term debts upon which the pay-
ments provided by the plan extend beyond the term of the 
plan also are not discharged by a section 1328(b) dis-
charge. §1328(c). 
